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  Economists assume decision makers are rational and self-interested, and build 
models based on these assumptions.  Results from these models are intended to provide 
insights into both consumer and producer behavior.   In addition to their research, 
economists also generally teach as though students are consistently rational, logical, and 
analytical decision makers.   However, decades of psychological research demonstrates 
that people frequently make decisions based on emotional reactions, interpersonal 
pressures, and cultural standards.  Studies show that humans then apply ad hoc logic and 
analytical reasoning in an attempt to explain the decisions we have already made.   
Teaching agricultural economics at the undergraduate level is a challenging task.  Some 
student difficulties in learning economics must certainly come from the fact that human 
beings are not always the rational, logical, analytical, self-interested beings that 
economists assume.  Further, students may not recognize themselves when economists 
describe rational and self-interested behavior underlying our models. 
  Bridging the gap between economics and psychology, neuroeconomics may 
provide economics instructors with understanding and models of decision-making that 
aid in teaching economics.  This growing field applies concepts and theories from 
psychology and experimental methods from neuroscience to better understand actual 
human economic behavior.  Neuroeconomics, also referred to as “decision neuroscience” 
makes a crucial distinction between automatic (“hot”) and controlled (“cold”) decision-
making processes. Automatic processes are quick, efficient, reactive, and can often be 
carried out in parallel.  In addition, automatic processes frequently originate from emotions and are often based on instant reactions to stimuli.  In direct contrast, controlled 
processes are deliberate, sequential, voluntary, and analytical. Economists base their 
theoretical models of human decision-making on controlled processes.   Controlled 
processes represent the “rational” side of human decision-making.  Economists assume 
that everyone uses controlled, rational modes of thinking during every decision-making 
process.  Neuroscience research supports the distinction between automatic and 
controlled processing. In fact, research shows that automatic decisions occur in the 
emotional centers of the brain (limbic and paralimbic system) while controlled processes 
occur in the planning and organization centers of the brain (orbitofrontal cortex, anterior 
and dorsolateral regions of the prefrontal cortex).   
  Reconceptualizing human decision-making as a result of both automatic and 
controlled processing has many implications for agricultural economics and agribusiness 
teaching programs. If we teach students to recognize these different decision making 
processes, they can understand how they make their own decisions.  In turn, this will help 
them to better learn economics, understanding that economic models are based on 
“rational,” controlled processes of decision-making.  It may also help them learn to be 
more effective decision makers, emphasizing the logical, analytical, planning functions 
that are so valuable to economic success, and recognizing the strengths and weaknesses 
of both processes used in decision making. 
  In this paper, we will first discuss the relationship between economics and applied 
economics, and how merging disciplines can cause challenges to the field of economics.  
We will then present the general principles of the dual-process theory of decision-making 
using recent neuroscience research to support it.  We will then apply some of the principles of dual-process theory of decision-making to specific economic topic areas.  
We conclude with results of a survey conducted in a Risk Management course and 
include future directions for applying neuroeconomics to traditional agricultural 
economics teaching.   
 
Economics, applied economics, and challenges to the profession 
Traditionally, economists resist the recognition that individuals might be irrational 
or biased when making decisions.  According to McFadden (1999), the rational consumer 
model is so deeply entwined in economic analysis that it is difficult for many economists 
to imagine that failures of rationality could infect major economic decisions or survive 
market forces.  However, McFadden proceeds to say that there is accumulating 
behavioral evidence against the rational model.  McFadden calls a consumer “Chicago 
man” if s/he conforms to the standard economic model of perception, preference, and 
process rationality.  He makes four observations about the Chicago man model:  it is 
convenient, successful, unnecessarily strong, and it is false.  The Chicago man model is 
false because there is overwhelming behavioral evidence against literal interpretations of 
Chicago man as a universal model of choice behavior.  McFadden goes on to list twenty-
five major cognitive anomalies.  In summarizing the evidence, he concludes that 
perception rationality fails, and process rationality fails, but he maintains some hope that 
preference rationality may hold given that evidence against it is primarily circumstantial.  
He states that confronted with the accumulated experimental evidence, economists must 
recognize that the Chicago-man model does not apply universally, or even regularly to 
choices made in non-market contexts.     The idea that Chicago-man type behavior cannot be assumed presents problems 
for the economics profession in general.  McFadden suggests that economists should 
evolve Chicago man, correcting the most glaring deficiencies as a behavioral model and 
modifying economic analysis so that it applies to more realistic human behavior.  This is 
a difficult task since one of the benefits of the rationality assumptions is the relative 
simplicity of the analysis that follows.   
  Mittelhammer (2009) concurs with McFadden and states that there appears to be a 
steadily increasing call for both relevance and accountability in the work of economists.  
This spills over to agricultural economists who frequently view themselves as applied 
economists (even though Mittelhammer goes on to point out that there does not appear to 
be a universally accepted definition or even concept associated with the term, “applied 
economics”).  Mittelhammer believes there has been an evolution in the profession that 
has arguably led to a narrowing in the scope of professionally acceptable frameworks for 
conducting applied economics analyses.  He argues that this narrowing may be impeding 
rather than fostering advances in the field.  The pendulum, it seems, may have swung far 
enough that a correction in the view of what constitutes acceptable applied economics 
may be beneficial, overdue, and perhaps even already underway.  Further, the more 
varied and comprehensive the collection of approaches used to analyze the complex 
economic issues existent in the real world, the better.  This complexity of ideas leaves the 
door open to recognition of new decision making paradigms that more accurately reflect 
how decision makers operate. 
  Undergraduate teachers do not face problems nearly as substantial as those that 
researchers face in introducing these new models of decision making.  Students can benefit greatly from lively, valuable discussions of how people really make decisions, 
and comparisons with the theoretical “Chicago man” decision-making model.  McFadden 
(1999) believes that the discipline of economics needs to catch up to the field of 
marketing to understand the extent to which the mix and presentation of products reflects 
anomalies in consumer behavior.  In a presentation entitled “Behavioral Economics into 
the Classroom” (2006), Alan B. Krueger, Ph.D. concluded that there are many reasons 
that we should bring behavioral economics into the classroom, including the following: 
  It trains students to avoid making serious mistakes down the road  
  It clarifies what is rational and irrational decision-making 
  It leads to a better understanding of opportunity costs, time discounting,      
and other important economic concepts. 
  It provides a leg up in the business world 
  It provides a richer, more realistic understanding of decision-making in 
practice. 
  It can lead to better policies 
  It is easy to explain and demonstrate in class. 
Students who are aware of their own departures from rationality will be able to prevent 
others from taking advantage of these tendencies.  That is, they can improve their 
decision making by improving their self-awareness.   
Ariely (2009) believes that recognizing where humans depart from the ideal 
rational being is an important part of the quest to truly understand ourselves, and one that 
promises many practical benefits.  Understanding irrationality is important for our    
everyday decisions, and for understanding how we design our environment and the choices it presents to us.  He believes that we are not only irrational, but predictably 
irrational—that our irrationality happens the same way, again and again.  If this is the 
case, and experiments demonstrate this, then wouldn’t it make sense to teach students 
about some of these irrational tendencies?  Wouldn’t students benefit from better 
understanding both their rational and  irrational tendencies?  The beauty of this approach 
is that it allows for changes in decision making.  If we as economists just assume 
irrationality away, little room exists to recognize and improve upon how we decide.  
However, recognizing our irrational biases can lead to more effective decision-making 
that benefits both the individual and the greater economy.   
 
Dual process models of decision making 
As mentioned earlier, traditional economic theory ignores psychological theories 
of emotions, interpersonal influences, and cultural norms.  About thirty years ago, Thaler 
and Shefrin (1981) modeled the individual as an organization.  They believed that at any 
point in time, each individual is both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer.  More 
recently, experts have expanded on this notion and have proposed a dual process 
framework of decision making.  Fudenburg and Levine (2006) offer a simple “duel-self” 
model that provides a unified explanation for several empirical difficulties in explaining 
behavior.  They assert that many types of decision problems should be viewed as a game 
between a sequence of short-run “impulsive selves” and a long-run “patient self.”  Ashraf 
and colleagues (2006) report that Adam Smith argued that behavior was determined by 
the struggle between what Smith termed the “passions” and the “impartial spectator”.  
They say that Smith viewed behavior as under the direct control of the passions, but believed that people could override passion-driven behavior by viewing their own 
behavior from the perspective of an outsider—the impartial spectator.  Loewenstein 
(2000) expands on this notion, asserting that a wide range of emotions, drive states, and 
feeling states grab people’s attention and impact their behavior.   He argues that people 
are powerfully influenced by their emotional states, and he discusses how to model 
individuals when they are in a hot state or in a cold state.  Loewenstein and colleagues 
(2003) have also used state-dependent utility to model decision making—that is, the 
mental state of the individual influences the utility received from consumption.  They 
work to explain projection bias in particular—a situation whereby people exaggerate the 
degree that their future tastes will resemble their current tastes.  They review a variety of 
domains supporting the existence of poor decision making due to projection bias.  Shiv 
and Fedorikhin (1999) examine how consumer decision making is influenced by 
automatic processes and more controlled processes.  They believe that when our rational, 
analytical cognitive processes are available, they have an dominating impact on and 
influence over our behaviors.  In contrast, when our analytical processes are in use or 
overloaded, our emotions have greater impact on our decisions.  Benhabib and Bisin 
(2004) developed a model of consumption where individuals have the ability to invoke 
either automatic processes or alternative control processes.  According to them, automatic 
processes are susceptible to temptation and control processes are immune to such 
temptations.   
Neuroscience research supports the distinction between automatic and controlled 
processing (Camerer, 2008; Sanfey, 2007).  Early research resulted from disease models 
of individuals with neurological damage.  These individuals showed predictable changes in decision-making.  Bechara (2004) discusses several studies of decision-making in 
neurological patients who can no longer process emotional information normally.  
Damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex renders patients unable to make 
advantageous, rational decisions. These individuals have no regard for consequences and 
instead make judgments at a “gut” or emotional level.   
Research has also gone beyond disease-models, and has examined “normal” 
decision-making as well.  Results from decision-making studies in primates demonstrate 
that the economic value of items is represented in the orbitofrontal cortex (Padoa-
Schioppa & Assad, 2006; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009).  Functional neuroimaging in humans 
has provided another way to examine the neural basis of decision making in real time.  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) provides a safe, noninvasive method to 
study normal human decision-making.  A recent study examined the relationship between 
self-control and decisions (Hare et al., 2009).  Results showed that goal-directed 
decision-making produced increased neural activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(the same brain area identified in the aforementioned neurological patients).   Exercising 
self-control required inhibition of this goal-directed activity by increasing activation in 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  Researchers interested in the influence of uncertainty 
on decision-making demonstrated that risk and ambiguity are represented in two separate 
regions of the brain (Hsu et al., 2005).   
Cognitive neuroscientists have also examined brain regions involved when people 
must decide between immediate or delayed rewards.  These delayed discounting, or 
intertemporal choice, paradigms are directly relevant to economic behavior and decision-
making.  McClure and colleagues (2004) proposed a model, the β-δ model, that emphasizes the limbic system’s (emotional center) role in immediate rewards while the 
prefrontal cortex (planning, organization) is involved in choosing larger, delayed 
rewards.  Adolescents are notorious for making impulsive, irrational decisions. 
Neuroscience research again supports this notion as the reward centers of the teenage 
brain (emotional decisions) are particularly sensitive and the cognitive control regions 
(rational decisions) are underdeveloped (Leijenhorst et al., 2010).  One recent study 
aimed to alter decision-making in adults so that the participants would more greatly value 
larger delayed rewards (Peters & Buchel, 2010).  Researchers were successful in helping 
participants make more controlled, rational decisions.   
Mukherjee (2010) unites neuroscience findings, psychological paradigms, and 
economic theory into a dual model for decision making that utilizes both automatic and 
controlled processes.  He indicates that existing models in economics use only a single 
system, although he notes that economics is being increasingly influenced by a multiple 
systems approach to decision making.  Mukherjee proposes that we generate values 
through the use of two psychological processes: valuation by calculation and valuation by 
feeling.  He develops a parameter that represents the relative extent of emotional 
involvement.  This provides insight into different decision making processes for oneself 
than for an organization.  He feels that his model can be applied to a wide variety of 
empirical phenomena and can account for many anomalies in present representations of 
decision making processes. 
Russell James, Ph.D., (Department of Housing and Consumer Economics, 
University of Georgia) has developed a set of PowerPoint slides that present the duel 
process model of decision making.  They also discuss a large number of irrational tendencies and biases that humans have demonstrated.  He has made these slides 
available for downloading through slide share.  The slides are nicely illustrated, invite 
student interaction, and do an excellent job of keeping students’ attention. 
 
 
Areas of Application in Agribusiness and Agricultural Economics 
Agricultural economics and agribusiness may greatly benefit from having a 
framework for decision making that includes both controlled and automatic processes.  
Agricultural economics and agribusiness programs should integrate the latest 
neuroeconomics research for effective, meaningful teaching. It is important that we 
provide students with a conceptual framework they can use to accurately comprehend 
human decision-making, consumer, and producer behavior.  Conceptualizing decision-
making as a dual-process theory will also help students understand their own behavior.  
Hopefully, this will help students better know themselves and the frameworks that we 
teach—realizing that economic theory relies on assumptions that often do not fit actual 
human behavior.  Several examples of courses where this background might be helpful 
will now be discussed. 
 
Microeconomics 
Discussions related to decision making models could be extremely beneficial in 
any microeconomics courses including principles of microeconomics or intermediate 
microeconomics.  Students often have difficulty grasping the rational assumptions and 
their implications for behavior.  Arguments for or against allowing markets to function may also be influenced by this new framework. If consumers make emotional and 
irrational decisions in their purchases (which they often do), how well can consumers 
truly run a market economy?  Helping students be better consumers may be very 
important for a well functioning market.  Students who understand hot and cold decision 
making processes may avoid making poor decisions that are detrimental to both 
themselves and the market.  
Ariely (2006) states that we do not have an internal value meter that tells us how 
much things are worth.  Rather, we focus on the relative advantage of one thing over 
another, and estimate value accordingly.  Consequently, we often  fail to think broadly 
about options.  The result is that even the simple concept of “opportunity cost”  is not 
easy for students to comprehend.  As rational economists, we assume that students can 
easily understand the concept of opportunity cost.  However, when people naturally think 
in terms of the relative advantage of one option over another, they may fail to see  
numerous radically different comparisons that hold substantial promise. In fact, teaching 
the concept of “opportunity cost” should be accompanied by the explanation that we need 
to consider wide ranging options when thinking about foregone opportunities, not just the 
very similar items that are comparable to what is chosen. 
   
Finance 
Another area where a better understanding of human decision making processes 
might be particularly valuable is finance.  Understanding finance principles requires use 
of rational, analytical thought processes.  Applying these principles in decision making 
also requires the use of rational, controlled processes.  If an individual uses automatic processes (emotions) for decision making in finance, this often leads to financial 
mistakes.  Providing a framework for discussing financial decision making that includes 
both automatic and controlled processes may be extremely valuable for interpreting 
financial advice.  In fact, personal finance advice often offers second best strategies 
simply because the recommenders of the strategy know that decision makers are not 
disciplined enough to use controlled processes.  For example, the use of a credit card may 
be discouraged for people who make impulsive, unrestrained purchases. However, if one 
is disciplined and makes rational decisions, use of a credit card can be very efficient and 
even beneficial due to rebates based on purchase volume.  
Understanding the concept of the time value of money and how it is calculated 
centers on the use of controlled processes.  Automatic processes are heavily oriented to 
the present, and result in extremely high discount rates between now and the near future, 
and smaller discount rates between the near future and more distant future (hyperbolic 
discounting).  People who use automatic decision-making processes would be likely to 
spend more money and save less than people who use controlled decision-making 
processes. There are many additional examples of strategies that are second best (yet 






 Risk Management 
  Finally, having a framework for decision making that includes both controlled and 
automatic processes may be extremely valuable when applied to risk management. Risk 
management courses typically include analytical decision making techniques that use 
controlled processes.   However, analytical techniques often depend on uncertain 
outcomes and estimation of probabilities.  Numerous examples of consistently irrational 
and erratic tendencies in risk management decision making have been documented in 
behavioral economics and psychology.  Understanding these tendencies and biases are 
crucial to making better decisions.  Automatic, emotional decisions can potentially have  
large negative consequences in a number of situations related to risk management.  When 
attempting to assess risk preferences, both psychological tests that determine risk 
tolerance and lottery-type questions that elicit certainty equivalents measure controlled 
decision making processes.  Neither type of test recognizes or assesses the emotions that 
influence markets at different times.  In addition, emotional decisions based on automatic 
processes are responsible for much behavior in markets.  For example, buying stock after 
stocks have risen substantially is an emotional response to missing out on the gains, and 
selling stocks near the low stems from  the emotional response of fear and panic.  
Emotions themselves can drive a feedback loop that  makes values  rise too high or fall 
too low.  Loewenstein and colleagues (2001) have proposed a “risk-as-feelings” 
hypothesis that highlights the role of emotions experienced at the moment of decision 
making.  They report that much research shows that emotional reactions to risky 
situations often diverge from controlled assessments of those risks.  Further, when such 
divergence occurs, the emotional reactions often drive behavior.  Finally, we should recognize that many decisions will be made using automatic processes because 
individuals do not have the data necessary to use the analytical techniques we often teach.  
Thus students should be alerted to common decision-making biases associated with the 
automatic processes.  The next section will go into more detail about the specific 
applications of dual-process theory of decision making to risk management. 
 
A sample of irrational decision making and biases relevant to economics 
There are many patterns of irrational decision-making and decision-making biases 
that have been identified.  Below are some of the most common and most relevant to 
economics.   
 
Hyperbolic discounting 
Sopher and Sheth (2005) report that the logical inconsistencies associated with 
non-constant discounting and the tendency of some people to discount in a non-constant 
manner have been documented in many experimental studies.  These studies  report that 
later consequences seem to be discounted at a lower rate than early consequences. This is 
the delayed discounting paradigm commonly used in behavioral neuroeconomics.  They 
report that a hyperbolic discount function is an alternative to constant discounting that 
has been proposed to accommodate the types of violations of constant discounting 
commonly observed in experimental studies.  In their study, their results show that the 
absolute magnitude of the evidence supporting the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis is 
rather small.  They suggest trying to come up with a plausible statistical account of the observed behavior rather than to enshrine what may be, after all, just a collection of 
biases in human behavior. 
  The important point is that non-constant discounting has been well-documented in 
many experimental and neuroimaging studies.  Students need to understand the 
consequences of the mismatch between the constant discounting methods and real-life 
variable discounting rates which likely better reflects their own preferences.  Preliminary 
neuroimaging results suggest that these hyperbolic discounting curves could be altered 
(Peters & Buchel, 2010).  One study summoned personally-relevant future episodic 
information (e.g. a family member’s birthday, a planned vacation) for the participants to 
consider.  This self-reflection strategy enabled participants to make more rational, 
controlled decisions about immediate versus delayed reinforcement.  Helping students 
better understand  discounting may ensure that they are less vulnerable to immediate 
gratification, in turn allowing them the opportunity to make more rational decisions 
saving for the future.   
 
Diversification Bias 
  Kogler and Kuhberger (2007) describe diversification bias as the tendency to 
choose differently in identical choice situations.  They use the dual process model and 
argue that the diversification bias is a consequence of the automatic system which fails to 
be corrected by the controlled system.  This bias leads people to keep options open and 
select different strategies even when confronted with the same situation.  This bias can 
have serious negative consequences when applied to marketing and other economic 
situations.  One example of keeping options open is the tendency to delay marketing—always allowing one to keep the option of selling open.  The result is waiting far too long 
thus accumulating storage costs and the opportunity costs and missing high prices that 
were good marketing opportunities. 
 
Anchoring 
Ariely, Lowenstein, and Prelec (2006) challenge the assumption that people know 
their tastes.  They review research showing that valuation of ordinary products can be 
manipulated by non-normative cues (anchors).  This makes the process of decision-
making subject to anchors that can be easily manipulated by marketing strategies.  
Understanding this possibility, and attempting to control the anchors we use in evaluating 
decisions could potentially help make decision-making more effective.   
 
Paradox of Choice 
Economists believe that the more choices people have, the better.  They trust that 
because the choice set is expanded the selection from a rational standpoint cannot be 
made worse.  Recent empirical studies, however, have provided clear evidence to the 
contrary.  Iyengar and Lepper (2000) conducted three experiments that showed 
participants actually reported greater subsequent satisfaction with their selections when 
options were limited.  The notion that people actually have too many choices has been 
termed, “the tyranny of freedom” (Schwartz 2000).  This phenomena directly shows that 
people do not make rational decisions, and can be used to begin the discussion of how 
irrational individuals often are. 
  
Loss aversion and the endowment effect 
Loss aversion and the endowment effect were studied by Kahneman, Knetsch and 
Thaler (1990).  They found that randomly assigned owners of a mug required 
significantly more money to part with their possession (around $7) than randomly 
assigned buyers were willing to pay to acquire it (around $3). This can be attributed to 
loss aversion: owners’ loss of the mug loomed larger than the buyers’ gain of the mug. 
This effect causes a divergence between willingness to buy and willingness to sell. 
Sometimes this is called “the endowment effect.” 
 
Status Quo Bias 
The Status Quo Bias can be described as a tendency to make decisions by 
accepting the default option instead of comparing the marginal benefit to the marginal 
cost.  Decision-makers have an overwhelming tendency to adopt defaults, to stick with 
the status quo even when the decision is important and the stakes are large and when the 
decision-maker is told that the default is suboptimal. Madrian and Shea (2001) found 
examples of this bias in participation in 401(k) plans, savings programs, and asset 
allocation.  This illustrates the idea that people often stick to the automatic process and do 
not let the controlled process help them make better decisions.  Better recognition of this 




Survey Results  
A questionnaire was developed specifically for the purpose of assessing student 
response to the dual-process theory of decision-making and the many relevant 
applications of the dual-process model of decision-making. The questionnaire is included 
in the Appendix.  Students were introduced to the dual-process theory in an upper level 
undergraduate course titled Risk Management in the Agricultural Economics Department 
at Kansas State University.  Based on survey results, none of the 24 students who filled 
out the survey had previous exposure to this material, or the illustrations of irrational 
decision making and biases that often exist for decision-makers. 
Students were asked four questions regarding the benefit of understanding dual 
process to decision making for learning economics and in understanding their own 
decision making.  The students were asked if having the dual-process framework is useful 
now for learning “rational decision making processes”.  On a scale of 1 (no, not at all) to 
3 (somewhat) to 5 (yes, definitely), the average response was 3.96.  One student noted on 
his first exam that he had spent $37,000 in tuition for classes teaching that we are all 
rational.  In this course, he finds out that we aren’t rational!  The second question asked if 
understanding the dual-self framework earlier in college would have made it easier to 
learn the economic thought process.  Their response was 3.38 on the same scale.  Another 
question asked if they thought other economics students would benefit from learning the 
dual-self framework early in their program, and the response was higher than the first two 
questions at 4.17.  Finally, we asked if thinking about decision-making as a dual-self 
process aids in better understanding their own decision making process, and the average response was 4.46, the highest ranking of all the questions.  The above quantitative 
responses converged with the instructor’s qualitative impressions of the students’ 
response to the course.  The instructor felt that the student response to this material was 
overwhelmingly positive.  Students recognize, particularly in a risk management course, 
that rational processes are difficult to utilize due to the lack of numbers to use rationally. 
The survey also asked students if learning about the dual self process would make 
them think more carefully about how they will make decisions in the future.  The 
response was 4.21 on a scale of 1 (no, not at all) to 5 (yes, definitely) indicating that they 
believe this material will help them think more carefully about decision making in the 
future.  The survey also asked if they would like to change the way they make decisions, 
(that is be more rational, or me more emotional).  Their response was a 3.08 on a scale of 
1 (no, not at all) to 5 (yes, definitely).   
Included in the questionnaire were questions asking students to evaluate their own 
current decision-making on a scale of 1 (rational/controlled) to 5 (emotional/automatic) 
in 11 of areas of their lives.  The average rankings are shown in Table 1. 
It is interesting to note that their rankings were lowest (meaning that they were the 
most rational/controlled) when making decisions about credit cards and loans/debt, and 
they were the most emotional/automatic when making decisions about hobbies/leisure 
time and health/diet/exercise.  Given the obesity epidemic in the country, it may be 
valuable for all students to recognize decision making processes in order to make better 
health choices related to food consumption and exercise. 
 
 Table 1.  Current Decision-making  
Domain  Mean score 
School/Career  2.04 
Health/Diet/Exercise  3.13 
Personal spending  2.46 
Saving/Investing  2.33 
Loans/Debt  1.79 
Credit cards  1.71 
Romantic relationships  2.78 
Friendships  2.71 
Alcohol/Tobacco Use  2.67 
Hobbies/Leisure time  3.46 
Religion/Spirituality  2.46 
 
Finally, they were asked how they would like to change their decision making 
process on a scale of 1 (be more rational/controlled) to 3 (stay the same) to 5 (be more 
emotional/automatic).  The responses are given in Table 2.  The lowest numbers 
representing the strongest desire to be more rational/controlled were the categories of 
health/diet/exercise and personal spending.  It is also interesting to note that all the 
rankings were less than three, indicating that on average, students desire to be more 





 Table 2.  Desire to Change Decision-making  
Domain  Mean score 
School/Career  2.13 
Health/Diet/Exercise  1.77 
Personal spending  1.91 
Saving/Investing  2.04 
Loans/Debt  2.26 
Credit cards  2.30 
Romantic relationships  2.64 
Friendships  2.87 
Alcohol/Tobacco Use  2.48 
Hobbies/Leisure time  2.74 
Religion/Spirituality  2.45 
 
Several students included qualitative comments as well, which we felt were worth 
including: 
“I believe knowing about the dual-self framework makes you stop and think 
before making decisions. It forces you to decide which dual-self, either the 
elephant (automatic system) or rider (controlled system), should be involved in 
making the decision.” 
 
“This class has showed a different side of learning and decision making that most 
will not tell you. I have found it interesting and helpful.” 
 
“I think that this class is greatly beneficial to the way a person should look at 
decisions when using the dual-self framework for behavior.”  
Summary 
Economics characterizes humans as perfectly rational cognitive machines, 
operating in a logical, predictable fashion.  We know that humans are not always rational, 
however.  Using the strengths of different disciplines, we can begin to better understand 
human decisions and behavior.  Psychology’s strengths lie in theories and empirical 
behavioral tasks.  Neuroscience uses very precise methodology to gain a better 
understanding of the neural, biological, and physiological basis of behavior.  Economics 
uses mathematically-sound formal modeling.  Merging these three disciplines, the field of 
neuroeconomics, will help provide a more comprehensive understanding of human 
decision-making.  This paper has provided an overview of an emerging dual-process 
model of human decision-making.  We discussed a number of examples from behavioral 
economics that illustrate the fact that people often make irrational decisions and have 
biased tendencies in decision-making.     
Recognition of the two types of decision-making:  controlled/rational and 
automatic/emotional may explain why it is so difficult for students to relate to rational 
economic decision making.  It also helps explain why instructors become so frustrated in 
teaching basic economics concepts.  From our Risk Management survey results, it was 
clear that students felt that learning the dual-process model of decision-making was both 
enjoyable and helpful.  Teachers crave successful students and it seems that using the 
dual-process theory of decision making can be invaluable in student comprehension and 
satisfaction.  Recognition of the different decision making processes should result in more effective teaching and should benefit students as they strive to learn both basic and 
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1.  Did this class provide your first exposure to the dual-self framework of decision-making? 
 
      Yes      No 
 
2.  If not, when/where did you first learn about the dual-self framework of decision-making? 
 
When   __________________________________ (ex. High school, college) 
 
Where  __________________________________ (ex. a class, leisure reading, a friend) 
 
If another class, which one?    __________________________________ 
 
3.  Is having a dual-self framework useful now for learning “rational decision making processes” 
generally taught in economics? 
 
No, not at all           Somewhat        Yes, definitely 
1    2    3    4    5 
 
4. Would understanding the dual-self framework earlier in college have made it easier to learn 
“the economic thought process” which is emphasized throughout the economics program? 
 
No, not at all           Somewhat        Yes, definitely 
1    2    3    4    5 
 
5.  Do you think that other economics students would benefit from learning about the dual-self 
framework of decision-making early in their program of study?   
 
No, not at all           Somewhat         Yes, definitely 
1    2    3    4    5 
 
6. Does thinking about decision-making as a dual-self process aid you in better understanding 
your own decision making process?   
 
No, not at all           Somewhat         Yes, definitely 
1    2    3    4    5 
 
7.  How you do view your own current decision-making in regards to the following areas: 
    Rational/Controlled                 Emotional/Automatic 
      1    2    3    4    5 
 
School/Career    1    2    3    4    5 
Health/Diet/Exercise  1    2    3    4    5 
Personal spending  1    2    3    4    5 
Saving/Investing  1    2    3    4    5 
Loans/Debt    1    2    3    4    5 
Credit cards    1    2    3    4    5 Romantic Relationships 1    2    3    4    5 
Friendships    1    2    3    4    5 
Alcohol & Tobacco use  1    2    3    4    5 
Hobbies/Leisure time  1    2    3    4    5 
Religion/Spirituality  1    2    3    4    5 
 
8.  After learning about theories of how people make decisions, do you think that you will think 
more carefully about how you make decisions in the future?   
 
No, not at all            Somewhat         Yes, definitely 
1    2    3    4    5 
 
9.  Would you like to change the way you make decisions? (ex. Be more rational? or Be more 
emotional?) 
 
No, not at all            Somewhat         Yes, definitely 
1    2    3    4    5 
 
10. In the following areas, how would you like to change your decision-making process? 
 
Be more Rational/Controlled       Stay the same            More Emotion/automatic 
      1    2    3    4    5 
 
School/Career    1    2    3    4    5 
Health/Diet/Exercise  1    2    3    4    5 
Personal spending  1    2    3    4    5 
Saving/Investing  1    2    3    4    5 
Loans/Debt    1    2    3    4    5 
Credit cards    1    2    3    4    5 
Romantic Relationships 1    2    3    4    5 
Friendships    1    2    3    4    5 
Alcohol & Tobacco use  1    2    3    4    5 
Hobbies/Leisure time  1    2    3    4    5 
Religion/Spirituality  1    2    3    4    5 
 
 
11.  Other comments: 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 